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THE AFTERMATH OF HEGELIAN RATIONALISM; 
THE ROMANTICISM OF KIERKEGAARD 
AND NIETZSCHE 
by 
Seth Joseph Zinder 
Following the temporarily inescapable and predominating rationalism which reaches 
its apex with the Hegelian system, romanticism blossoms as a revolutionary and transi-
tionary movement in Western philosophy. While the Hegelian rationalism appears so 
massive as to explain sufficiently and encompass all things, it also brings sterility to 
individuals who are actually full of spirit and vitality. Rational theories, in other words, 
appear alienated, abstract and unreal to individuals living irrationally,1 emotionally, 
and without focus or continuity. And with the conception of the individual as purely 
sentient comes the romantic assertion that rational philosophy, or perhaps philosophy 
itself, is intrinsically incapable of accurately interpreting our human condition. So dur-
ing the long and dominant rule ofrational methodology, the seeds ofromanticism were 
beginning their growth, and when rationalism became too far embedded in the abstrac-
tion of thought, romanticism sprang into existence bringing with it new light, vigor, 
and a revived passion for the immediate and concrete. 
The major assumption of philosophical rationalism is that there exists an essential 
continuity and similarity to all human experience which can only be comprehended 
through reason. Underlying the apparent chaos, lack of continuity and dissimilarity of 
the subjective world, there is a rationally discernible thread of connectedness. "Regarded 
as the connectedness of (particular) content (philosophy) is the necessary expansion of 
that content into an organic whole" (Hegel 20). The task of philosophical rationalism, as 
Hegel sees it, is to transform or construct worldliness, the subjective and experiential, 
into a rational reality. 
Culture and the laborious emergence from the immediacy of substantial life 
must always begin by getting acquainted with general principles ... so as to 
work up to a general conception ... as well as learn to support and refute the 
general conception with reasons (Hegel 3). 
Rationalism, furthermore, is a method of interpreting a variety of subjective experi-
en~es systematically, for "knowledge is only actual and can only be expounded," Hegel 
writes, "as a science or as a system" (Hegel 24). In other words, the 'accidental' or the 
subjective parts must be conceived in terms of a functioning system. The individual 
1 
"Irrational" must be understood as both pre-rational and trans-rational. Both 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche speak of an aesthetic personality being pre-rational, and 
Kierkegaard also speaks of a religious personality being trans-rationaL 
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experience has its fullest and most concrete meaning in the context of its entire systema-
tic environment. The subjective experience of the individual must be expounded or 
raised to the universal, where it can be properly understood according to a common and 
rational explanation, applicable irrespective of time or location. Philosophical rational-
ism, then, "consists not so much in purging the individual of an immediate sensuous 
mode of apprehension ... but rather [giving] ... actuality to the universal" (Hegel 33). The 
particular, then, is not a 'thing in itself', but is rather a reflection or representation of the 
universal. 
Rationalism, seen as a scientific method, generally divorces itself from the 'acciden-
tal' or peculiar aspects of life , placing greater emphasis on its search for an 'essential' 
quality of existence. Hegel notes, for instance, that a particular or 'accidental' can only 
be addressed with inexpressive, inadequate linguistic terms. He writes, "if nothing more 
can be said of something than that it is an 'actual thing' ... its description is only the 
most abstract of generalities and in fact expresses its sameness rather than its distinc-
tiveness" (Hegel 66). Logically, then, peculiarities must be brought into the universal for 
meaning. It is here, however, that the romantics depart from the rationalists. 
The romantics assert that indeed subjectivity or peculiarity cannot be explained, but 
only because explanations and thoughts are always bound by reason. Subjectivity, 
however, does in fact exist, not ideologically but phenomenologically, and to understand 
particularity only in terms of universality is to severely distort it. The romantics claim 
that there is no actual 'meaning' in a subjective experience, for 'meanings' too lie only in 
the realm of reason. There is always, however, an immediate sensitivity and an emo-
tional inwardness which the individual experiences, and this inward responsiveness 
had a purity which should neither be debased nor stifled through rational methods. In 
short, there is in romanticism a pre-ideological naturalness which exists as a 'thing in 
itself'. 
In accordance with this romantic tradition, Soren Kierkegaard asserts that individu-
als live only in an immediate and most personal existence which is always confirmed by 
their tenderness and emotional inwardness. We live and recognize our existence, 
Kirkegaard maintains, through an inner intensity that cannot be reflected through the 
deceptive and illusive use of reason. In other words, rational abstractions hold a limited 
appeal for and exercise little influence on individuals at the pre-rational or trans-rational 
level. Thought can only concern itself with concepts, universals, and abstractions and, 
therefore, falsifies and fails to reflect one's wholly individual and sentient existence. 
"For to think that for an instant one can break off and bring to a halt the course of the 
personal life, is a delusion" (Kierkegaard 168). In short, subjective and emotional experi-
ence, which is the whole of man's existence, cannot be given generalized meaning. 
The Hegelian individual is moved determinedly and dialectically through a series of 
developmental stages becoming actual and defined in the universal. The individual, 
here, exists as a dynamic interplay of relations and as a cultural configuration. 
Kierkegaard, on the other hand, asserts that we do not live as a configuration of univer-
sals, but as remote islands which allow for no transcendent or imaginative escape. The 
individual cannot become, for example, the State of Christianity, as Hegel envisages, 
for these are abstractions and concepts, while the individual is concrete and mundane. 
In fact, thought itself, for Kierkegaard, removes individuals from themselves and 
destroys individuals' peculiar existences. Since the individual acts on the impulse of 
sensuous emotions, reason provides only an inaccurate account of the self and reduces it 
to some common and general description. Kierkegaard writes that "in every man," par-
ticularly Hegel, "there is something which to a certain degree prevents him from becom-
ing perfectly transparent to himself ... Your own [the rationalistic] tactic is to train your-
self in the art of becoming enigmatic to everyone" (Kierkegaard 164). 
Rather than moving with all 'others' through a series of dialectical stages, the 
Kierkegaardian individual exists as a personality. Again, the individual is not a 
compilation of externals, but a self-contained, autonomous being motivated only by 
internal passions and energy. The romantic individual can only be understood as 
separate from rather than integrated and associated with all other individuals. Based 
on this notion, Kierkegaard classifies all individuals as beings with the potential to 
exist aesthetically, ethically, or religiously, and it is from this particular emotional type 
that individuals freely create their own isolated existence. 
The romantic consciousness is epitomized in the Kierkegaardian description of the 
aesthetic personality. The aesthetic individual is primarily a narcissist and a pre-
rationalist who creates consciousness and self-existence through satisfaction and plea-
sure. Furthermore, the aesthetic individual lives in an immediate present, the 'Here' and 
'Now', which always has the potential for an erotic satisfaction. Most essential to the 
aesthetic personality, as it is characteristic of romantic conciousness, is its lack of 
concern in distinguishing what is real. Aesthetic individuals by-pass a rational and 
thinking concern for that which they are presently enjoying, for happiness and satisfac-
tion can neither be understood nor experienced rationally. The aesthetic, like the 
romantic, will not reduce enjoyment to some categorical and rational interpretation in 
which it becomes common and stupefacient. Aesthetic individuals "are very close to the 
truth and feel the eternal validity of their personality ... even though they have refrained 
from giving voice to this perfectly abstract expression for the gladness of being them-
selves rather than anybody else" (Kierkegaard 218). In short, the romantic and aesthetic 
individuals make things real with passion, energy and internal responsiveness, rather 
than verifying reality through abstractions. 
The aesthetic individual lives in a rotating cycle of seeking pleasure, not obtaining it 
and trying to compensate for this loss only by continuing a search for pleasure. The 
aesthetic lives in a world of unlinked personal events, creating no self-history or self-
definition and without any continuity or unity of action. So while rationalism tries to 
discern the connectedness and purpose of one's existence, the aesthetic individual lives 
in undifferentiated passion, a world void of principle and hesitance. Aesthetic individu-
als, Kierkegaard notes, fall into unhappy consciousness when they begin to recognize 
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the repetition of their unfulfilled yearnings for satisfaction. What is crucial, however, is 
that the romantic life is thrown into despair and unhappiness only if rational con-
sciousness intervenes. There is, in short, no unhappy consciousness when there is no 
conciousness at all. The Nietzschian romanticism, which follows the Kierkegaardian 
philosophy chronologically and in spirit, claims a necessity to return to the naturalness 
and spontaneity of the aesthetic personality. The Nietzschian romanticism can be 
referred to, in this sense, as a philosophy against philosophy and a deconstructionalist 
philosophy in its condemnation of rational consciousness, philosophical seriousness, 
and all other culturally imposed ideologies. The individual, for Nietzsche, must be 
"carved" free from all the "layers" of abstractions and return to raw instinctiveness, the 
power of the will. Nietzsche claims, like Kierkegaard, that "all credibility, all good 
conscience, all evidence of truth comes only from the senses" (Nietzsche 88), while for 
Hegel "even an immediate intuition is held to have genuine value only when it is 
cognized as a fact afong with its reasons" (Hegel 24). 
Just as Kierkegaard maintains that an aesthetic individu,al is led into unhappiness by 
the interference.of consciousness, Nietzsche similarly contends that humanity at large 
has fallen into a "herd" mentality, bound by reason and arbitrary morality, and is, 
therefore, necessarily leading itself toward a neurotic and painful castration. In other 
words, humanity is already too far removed in the abstraction of thought to once again 
ground itself in the powers of the mundane and natural. From a cowardice to face the 
complexities of existence, man stifles the individual with a series of controls, of 'Thou 
Shalts' and 'Thou Shalt Nots'. Nietzsche complements Kierkegaard in asserting that 
rationalism and philosophy are, in actuality, a means of evading truth, for truth lies in 
the incomprehensible inner turmoil and ecstasy of the bodily individual. "The more 
abstract the truth is that you would teach," Nietzsche writes, "the more you have to 
seduce the senses to it" (Nietzsche 24). Again, our original ~pontaneity and vitality are 
suspended and stupefied by the disease of reason. 
The shift in emphasis from rationalism, the abstraction of thought, to romanticism, a 
passion for the immediate and concrete, should be regarded as a necessary transitional 
movement in philosophy. For philosophy itself to progress, even the Hegelian philos-
ophy, the zenith ofrationalism, had to create its own antithesis, the growth ofromanti-
cism. From this perspective, rationalism and romanticism must not be viewed as 
entirely incompatible with one another, but rather as mutually supplanting one another 
as unique and valuable explanations of our human condition. While rationalism unifies 
the "parts" of a system into a mechanical and orderly process, romanticism recognizes 
the spiritual and emotional levels of the individual, preaching subjectivity rather than 
cold objectivity. Regardless of their philosophical claims, both rationalism and roman-
ticism want philosophy to be applicable and compatible with the human situation. But 
if we are unities, compilations of both reason and emotion, and if philosophy aims at 
understanding and being compatible with our total humanness, then rationalism and 
romanticism must also co-exist as complementary perspectives on our human condition. 
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